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Introduction 
The career literature stresses the increasingly fragmented and often discontinuous nature of 
careers. Part of this evolution is the fact that, nowadays, people are interrupting their career more 
often. They may for instance quit wage employment temporarily to take care of their family, to get a 
degree or to start up a business. Some governments and policymakers introduce incentives for 
career breaks (Gould, 2004; Jones, 2005). These policies are based on the belief that career 
breaks may have an added value for individuals and the labor market. They may improve work-life 
balance, diminish the pressure on the active population, encourage lifelong learning, promote 
entrepreneurship and extend the labor market participation of older workers. For instance, the 
Employment Guidelines of the European Commission inspired several countries to develop insti-
tutionalized career break systems. 
But are these positive effects of career breaks not overestimated? Critics could argue that career 
breaks may impede career progression. Employees who achieve a better work-life balance by 
taking a career break, may have to pay for this advantage by a slower career progression, fewer 
opportunities for promotion and a slower wage increase compared to their full-time working 
colleagues. Insight in the effects of career breaks is crucial to evaluate career break policies. In this 
paper, we study the effect of career breaks on later wages.  
During the past 30 years, a great deal of empirical studies has looked into the wage effects of 
career interruptions (Spivey, 2005). Most research (Albrecht, Edin, Sundström & Vroman, 1999; 
Corcoran & Duncan, 1979; Light & Ureta, 1995; Spivey, 2005) concludes that career breaks nega-
tively affect the pay level (or evolution) in subsequent employment. Explanations for post-break 
wage penalties are commonly sought in human capital and signaling theories. Career breaks are 
equated with periods of skill degradation and non-learning, eroding the career breaker's human 
capital. Furthermore, employers are believed to interpret career breaks as a signal of low commit-
ment and below-average ambition. 
However, any evolution in human capital may be largely contingent on the nature of the interrup-
tion, more specifically on the activities taken on during the career break. It is also reasonable to 
assume that different types of interruptions send different signals to employers. In particular, one 
could hardly argue that career breaks taken to pursue further education or to start a business 
automatically and significantly decrease human capital. Also, employers may favor an educational 
or self-employment spell, rather than regard it with suspicion. Besides, signals may differ between 
men and women. Several types of career breaks are more common among women (e.g. family 
leave). Men taking on such a career break may differentiate themselves more strongly from their 
counterparts and may therefore send a stronger signal (e.g. of low ambition) to employers. This 
may cause a higher wage penalty. 
Most studies have measured the impact of career breaks regardless of their type or rationale 
(Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, 1983; Spivey, 2005; Stratton, 1995) or only distinguishing between 
specific types of family leaves (e.g. household time, birth leave, parental leave) and/or unemploy-
ment spells (Albrecht et al., 1999; Arun, Arun & Borooah, 2004; Baum, 2002; Gupta & Smith, 
2002). Little or no research on career breaks investigates the impact of educational leaves sepa-
rately. Some studies (e.g. Spivey, 2005; Stratton, 1995) exclude people who interrupted their 
career for educational reasons from their sample. However, most studies do not mention how they 
treat educational leaves (e.g. Arun et al., 2004; Corcoran et al., 1983; Gupta & Smith, 2002; 
Ketsche & Branscomb, 2003) or even join educational breaks with other types of breaks into one 
variable (e.g. Baum, 2002). The same can be said of self-employment. Moreover, only a few 
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studies use a mixed-gender sample and perform the analysis separately for men and women 
(Spivey, 2005).  
In this paper, we simultaneously study the wage effects of different types of interruptions, allowing 
for differential effects of break duration in function of the nature of the interruption. The types we 
will study are family leaves, unemployment spells, self-employment spells, educational leaves and 
a residual category, comprising “private” reasons to interrupt one's career (e.g. travel, rest, volun-
tary work). Family leaves and unemployment spells have received ample attention in literature (e.g. 
Albrecht et al., 1999; Arun et al., 2004; Baum, 2002; Bruce and Schuetze, 2004; Kunze, 2002), 
being perhaps the most obvious reasons why an individual is not working at some point in time. 
Our addition of self-employment spells and educational leaves is not only inspired by their under-
exposure in research on career breaks, but also by the growing recognition among policy-makers 
of the crucial role of lifelong learning (Jones, 2005; Jenkins, Vignoles, Wolf & Galindo-Rueda., 
2003) and entrepreneurship (House, 1993; Williams, 2000; Williams & Kitaev, 2005) in sustaining 
economic growth. It is far from certain whether career interruptions that are advocated by the 
government as a potential boost to employment and entrepreneurship also pay off for individuals 
once they return to wage employment.  
Besides this focus on different types of career breaks, our study also complements previous 
research by conducting separate analyses for men and women. In doing so, we investigate to what 
extent the impact of the different types of career breaks differ between male and female workers.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the literature on career breaks. Then we 
present the methodology and the results. The paper concludes with a discussion on the key impli-
cations of the research and some suggestions for future research. 
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1. Literature 
There exists a great deal of theoretical arguments about the effects of career breaks on later career 
wages. In the first section, we present the main arguments on the general wage impact of interrup-
tions, i.e. irrespective of the break’s nature. Next, we elaborate on the specific wage impact of the 
types of breaks included in our study. The last section focuses on the extent to which the impact of 
career breaks on later wages differs between men and women.  
1.1  The wage impact of career breaks in general 
Empirical evidence is unanimous: in general, career interruptions incur a wage penalty (Albrecht et 
al., 1999; Baum, 2002; Corcoran & Duncan, 1979; Light & Ureta, 1995; Spivey, 2005; Stratton, 
1995). On their return to employment, workers are often found to earn less in real terms than they 
did prior to the break. Even if this is not the case, their wage is bound to be inferior to the pay of co-
workers in similar employment who continued working.  
Studies taking break duration into account (e.g. Albrecht et al., 1999; Mincer & Ofek, 1982; Nielsen, 
Simonson & Verner, 2004; Spivey, 2005) invariably observe a positive correlation between duration 
and wage penalty: the longer the interruption, the lower the subsequent wage. Studies examining 
curvilinear effects of career breaks (e.g. Baum, 2002; Mincer & Ofek, 1982; Spivey, 2005) 
observed a convex function. This implies that the negative effect of duration on the subsequent 
wage weakens as the duration of the spell increases.  
Given the overwhelming evidence of a wage penalty, it is not surprising that theorizing is heavily 
skewed towards pointing out the negative consequences of career interruptions. We discuss 
explanations framed within human capital and signaling theory. 
A great portion of the explanations for the wage depreciation induced by career breaks build on 
human capital theory insights (Mincer & Ofek, 1982; Mincer & Polachek, 1974). The central 
reasoning is that a worker’s human capital decreases, or at best stagnates, during a career inter-
ruption. Outside the context of wage employment, job specific and organization specific experience 
diminishes, gets outdated or is rendered obsolete (Williams, 2000). Previously acquired skills, 
when not regularly practiced, are subject to processes of atrophy and depreciation.  
Additional to existing knowledge, skills and experience evaporating or becoming outdated, there is 
generally no or only little accumulation of new human capital (Baum, 2002; Corcoran et al., 1983). 
In particular, all opportunities for advancement that would have materialized if workers did not inter-
rupt their career are irrevocably lost. Career breakers miss out on training sessions and promo-
tions. Given that employers base their hire and pay decisions partly on perceived or assumed 
experience and skill levels, it is easy to see how career breaks, and their apparently inherent 
human capital depreciation, will harm an employee’s wage prospects. 
Moreover, as Baum (2002) and Corcoran and colleagues (1983) noted, employers will have diffi-
culties in predicting the human capital level of someone who has not been working for some time. 
Since there is little recent information on the person’s productivity, the wage level will often be set 
conservatively. So even when career breakers possess many relevant skills, they may have little 
proof (e.g. recent project output, favorable references by past employers) to show for it. 
Regardless of their real or perceived effect on human capital, career interruptions may also be 
penalized because of the signal they send out to potential employers (Albrecht et al., 1999; Kunze, 
2002; Spivey, 2005). A career break, whatever the motivation behind it, may be interpreted as a 
sign that a person is not dependable (“did it once, may do it again”) or has low work commitment, 
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which in turn may be seen as an indication of low productivity. This argument based on signaling 
theory helps to explain why career breaks with a likely similar effect on human capital (e.g. parental 
leaves and household leaves) may have a different impact on wages, as observed by Albrecht and 
colleagues (1999) and Kunze (2002).  
In general, signaling and human capital theory explanations are rather straightforward. Yet, some 
authors have questioned the clear-cut causal relationship between career interruptions and re-entry 
wages. Alternative explanations include reverse causality (low wages provoke career interruptions) 
and fake causality (e.g. career breakers being of lower average ability and therefore earning less 
afterwards). These theories are empirically disconfirmed (Gronau, 1988; Edin & Nynobb, 1992).  
1.2  The wage impact of specific types of career breaks 
After having sketched out the theoretical arguments behind the impact of career interruptions on 
later wages in general, we now focus on the impact of specific career breaks.  
Family leaves. Family leaves, including – among others – interruptions to give birth, parental 
leaves and time out for homemaking, have received much attention in literature. Overall, research 
concludes that these types of career breaks involve a wage penalty (Albrecht et al., 1999; Arun et 
al., 2002; Baum, 2002; Kunze, 2002). The general human capital and signaling explanations out-
lined above fully apply here. Moreover, employers may presume that employees returning after a 
family break will be absent more often, for instance to take care of ill children or for “family emer-
gencies” (Arun et al., 2002). For that reason, they may offer lower wages.  
Unemployment. Empirical evidence on unemployment seems to suggest that no other type of 
career interruption is as harmful to an employee’s wage prospects. Bruce and Schuetze (2004) 
found that unemployment spells cause a more severe wage penalty than self-employment. 
Albrecht and colleagues (1999) observed unemployment spells to be more harmful than breaks for 
family reasons or for military service. Mincer and Ofek (1982) noted that interruptions due to layoff 
have a greater than average wage depreciation effect.  
Essentially, this finding is an illustration of the scarring effect (Heckman & Borjas, 1980): unem-
ployment often inflicts a long-term scar, through the heightened future incidence of unemployment 
and lower earnings in subsequent employment. A non-negligible part of the labor force gets 
trapped in a vicious cycle, in which unemployment spells are merely interrupted by unstable, low-
pay employment spells (Gregory & Jukes, 2001). 
Self-employment. Self-employment breaks have been widely ignored in studies on the effect of 
career breaks on wages. While some authors explicitly exclude individuals with self-employment 
spells from the sample (e.g. Gupta & Smith, 2002), most are simply unclear about how they treat 
self-employment spells (for instance, whether they do not consider them at all, include them as 
work experience or as career breaks). We found some studies within the entrepreneurial literature 
that did investigate the impact of self-employment spells on the subsequent career. Their findings 
on the wage impact are ambiguous. Bruce and Schuetze (2004) found that short spells of self-
employment do not increase – and probably actually reduce – average hourly earnings on re-entry. 
Conversely, Hamilton (2000) discovered that the wages of ex-entrepreneurs are not significantly 
different from the earnings of non-interrupting employees and in some cases are actually higher. In 
a sample of white men, Evans and Leighton (1989) came to a similar conclusion.  
Several authors refer to human capital theory to explain non-negative wage effects of self-employ-
ment spells. Compared to career breaks not involving professional activities, self-employment 
substantially reduces the risk of skill atrophy (Williams, 2000). Additionally, during self-employment 
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individuals accumulate human capital that may be useful in wage employment situations (Niefert, 
2006). In particular, self-employment experience may be regarded favorably by employers who 
approve of employees displaying entrepreneurial attitudes, such as willingness to perform and self-
direction (Douglas & Shepherd, 2000). Apart from its signaling value, future employers may also 
see opportunities for attracting previous business contacts and clients of the entrepreneur. Actually, 
this social network may also help entrepreneurs to obtain a lucrative job on their return to wage 
employment. 
There are equally sound theoretical arguments why self-employment could negatively affect 
wages. Skills acquired during self-employment could hold little appeal to future employers (Evans & 
Leighton, 1989). Moreover, some skills valued by employers may be lost or remain 
un(der)developed during self-employment (Williams, 2004). Also, individuals who exit self-employ-
ment may be associated with failure. Niefert (2006) notes that this signal could be all the more 
negative if the self-employment is preceded by unemployment, an order of events that casts suspi-
cion on the motivation behind the entrepreneurship (an act of despair, rather than an ambitious 
employee pursuing her or his own business idea).  
Several authors also devote attention to possible self-selection effects (e.g. William, 2004). People 
who are less attractive to employers or who earn low pre-break wages may be more inclined to try 
their luck in self-employment. Their lower post-break wages are then not merely caused by their 
self-employment spell, but also by personal abilities. 
Educational leaves. Educational leaves and their impact on earnings have received little or no 
attention in empirical research. Studies examining effects of adult education are rarely clarifying 
whether the adult learners being investigated interrupted their employment career or not. Evidence 
emerging from these studies is mixed (Vignoles, Galindo-Rueda & Feinstein., 2004). Jenkins and 
colleagues (2003) found that, except for the least qualified employees, acquiring a formal qualifica-
tion in adulthood does not yield higher wages. Egerton and Parry (2001) and Liu and Xiao (2006), 
on their turn, concluded that adult education positively affects wages. Blundell, Dearden, Goodman 
and Reed (1997), Egerton (2000) and Steel and Sausman (1997) concluded that earning a gradu-
ate degree in adulthood pays off, yet less than earning the same degree before entering the labor 
market.  
Theoretical explanations cover both the positive and negative effects associated with educational 
leaves. Based on human capital theory, one expects lifelong learners to benefit financially, since 
any serious investment in education will boost an employee’s human capital level. This may raise 
employer’s productivity expectations and increase wages (Becker, 1964; Egerton, 2000; Vignoles 
et al., 2004). Moreover, individuals who re-enter education, often at great personal expense, may 
send a clear signal to employers that they are keen to learn, motivated to advance their careers, 
and that they recognize the necessity of updating competencies regularly.  
On the other hand, the signal may just as well be negative. Interrupting one’s career to start or 
resume an educational program could be considered as a sign of poor ability or an indication of low 
educational motivation as a youngster (Egerton, 2000; Jenkins et al., 2003; Vignoles et al., 2004). 
Finally, if the degree is perceived to be of little practical use (e.g. an accountant getting a master in 
philosophy), there may be a double backlash: the newly acquired human capital will go unrewarded 
and the career breaker may be marked as a freewheeler, lacking career commitment (Jenkins et 
al., 2003; Vignoles et al., 2004).  
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1.3  Gender differences in the impact of career interruptions on re-entry wages 
Most studies investigating the impact of career breaks on wages focused on women (Spivey, 2005; 
e.g. Arun et al., 2004; Baum, 2002; Corcoran et al., 1983; Gustafsson, 1981; Stratton, 1995). This 
practice stems from the conviction that career breaks – being more common among women – 
explain part of the gender wage gap (Baum, 2002). Only recently, researchers have started to 
include men in their samples. The studies using a mixed-gender sample generally find that men are 
penalized more severely for career breaks than women (e.g. Albrecht et al., 1999; Egerton & Parry, 
2001; Stafford & Sundström, 1996; Light & Ureta, 1995; Spivey, 2005).  
Signaling theory offers an explanation for this finding. Since career breaks are less common among 
men (Li & Currie, 1992), men send out a much stronger signal when taking a break. Hence, the 
penalty is likely to be more severe. Following this line of reasoning, it can further be expected that 
gender differences will be larger for types of career break that are more ‘feminine’, that is, more 
common among women. This is in line with the findings of Albrecht and colleagues (1999), who 
observed that parental and household leaves were more damaging for men than ‘masculine’ inter-
ruptions for military service. 
Our literature overview reveals that empirical findings are inconsistent. Moreover, most studies 
focus on only one or two types of career breaks and rarely look at gender differences. This paper 
complements and extends existing research by examining the effects of self-employment spells 
and educational leaves jointly with the more traditional family-related leaves and unemployment 
spells. Furthermore, we examine gender differences and allow for curvilinear effects of duration for 
each career break type. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants  and  procedures 
We conducted analyses on data from Belgium’s largest cross-sectional wage survey among 
employees. Participants were recruited by two widespread weekly job magazines, one published in 
Dutch and targeting the Flemish population, the other primarily serving French-speaking Belgians. 
We collected the data in May 2006, through a bilingual website. Slightly abridged versions of the 
questionnaires were printed in both job magazines, allowing respondents to fill in the survey on 
paper and return it by mail.  
Participation in the study was voluntary. Pre-survey instructions made clear that the research was 
aimed at active employees, including part-time and temporary workers, but excluding anyone who 
was not working for an employer in April 2006 (students, the unemployed, self-employed and 
retired). To boost participation, two substantial cash prizes (equivalent to the winner’s monthly 
wage) were randomly awarded after data collection. 
After deletion of incomplete and duplicate records, a database of 62,284 employees was compiled 
and subjected to rigorous data cleaning. We retained 57,480 data points on monthly wage. Of the 
62,284 respondents, 25,679 (41%) were female and 16,228 (26%) were French-speaking. Of all 
observations, 98,4% was collected via the Internet. To compensate for the non-random sampling, a 
weight factor was generated which corrects the combined sample distribution of age and educa-
tional level to Belgian population data of 2005.  
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2.2 Measures 
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the gross wage respondents earned in April 
2006. If wages were paid on a (bi)weekly basis, participants were asked to calculate the total 
amount earned in April 2006. In case of major monthly fluctuations, respondents were instructed to 
fill in the average wage of the past three months. Data cleaning involved checks on the ratio of the 
gross to the net wage. The credibility of outlier wages was assessed by reviewing the correspond-
ing job profiles. In a final step, part-timers’ wages were transformed to their full-time equivalent.  
Our independent variables of interest originate from a five-item question on career interruptions. In 
translation, the question read “Since starting your first job, have there been periods in which you 
were not working as an employee in the service of a company or organization?” The instruction 
asked participants to fill in the number of months their career has been completely and primarily 
interrupted for reasons expressed in each item. The five options comprised leaves for family 
reasons (pregnancy, child and elder care), unemployment spells, self-employment spells, educa-
tional leaves (start or restart an educational program) and breaks for “other reasons (e.g. travel, 
rest, voluntary work)”. The answers amount to a detailed indication of total break duration for each 
type. We cleaned the data and transformed the units from months to years. To be able to check for 
curvilinearity, we also calculated the quadratic terms for each of the five duration variables. 
We include a broad set of controls to allow an estimation of the net wage impact of career breaks, 
holding constant most traditional wage determinants. Controls fall into four categories (Milkovich & 
Newman, 1999). The first group consists of indications of the worker’s human capital (Becker, 
1964): educational level and years of wage employment experience, calculated as years since first 
(wage) employment minus the total duration of all career interruptions. The second set of controls 
comprise job characteristics, focusing on functional domain (e.g. marketing, sales, IT) and hierar-
chical level, measured as job level, budget responsibility and number of subordinates. A third group 
was made up by two organizational features, industry and the number of employees, as a measure 
of company size. The fourth category of controls relates to the labor contract: term, number of 
working hours and a dummy for part-time work.  
2.3 Analyses 
We conducted OLS regressions on the natural logarithmic transformation of the full-time equivalent 
monthly gross wage. The same equation, including the ten career break duration variables (five 
linear and five quadratic terms) and the controls as presented above, was estimated separately for 
men (n=25,541) and women (n=18,838). We used SAS software to estimate the intercept and the 
unstandardized regression coefficients, together with the models’ adjusted R².  
3. Results 
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of all variables, as well as their correlations 
with the key variables. Correlations among the control variables are not included in the table, but a 
check did not reveal any problems of multicollinearity. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of all variables and Pearson’s correlations with key variables 
Variable  Mean  s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Log  monthly s  age  (log  €)  7.86  0.39             gros w
2.  Gender  male  0.58  0.49  .25***        
3.  Wage  employment  (years)  10.8  8.70  .37*** .12***       
4.  Family  leaves  (years)  0.18  0.85  -.06*** -.22*** .09***       
  0.33  0.83  -.15*** -.07*** .11***  .09***     
rs)  0.30  1.63  .02*** .03*** .02***  .01  .03***      
7.  Educational leaves (years)  0.07  0.40  -.03*** -.02*** -.02***  .04*** .11*** .02***    
8. Other  breaks  (years)  0.06  0.46  -.01*  -.01**  .04***  .01**  .06*** .02*** .05***  
r education of 1 cycle  0.34  0.47  -.06*** -.08*** -.05***  .01*  -.06*** -.03*** -.01*  -.01 
education of 2 cycles  0.12  0.32  .14*** .10*** -.08***  -.02*** -.07*** -.02*** -.02*** -.02***
11.  Degree = university   0.23  0.42  .28*** .00  -.15***  .01*  -.08*** -.03*** .01*  -.01* 
12.  Domain = general management  0.08  0.27  .27*** .09*** .07***  -.03*** -.04*** .04*** -.01*  -.00 
13.  Domain = administration  0.16  0.36  -.16*** -.26*** .00  .07*** .06*** -.01**  .01*  .01* 
14.  Domain = technical support  0.08  0.27  -.01** .10*** .07***  -.01*  .03*** .007  -.01  -.00 
15.  Domain = marketing   0.04  0.19  .03*** -.04*** -.05***  -.02*** -.02*** -.01  .00  -.00 
0.14  0.34  -.01*  -.01  -.01**  -.01**  -.00  -.03*** -.01*  -.01* 
les services  0.02  0.13  -.03*** .09*** .02***  -.01**  -.00  .02*** -.00  0.00 
18.  Domain = finance   0.07  0.26  .02*** -.04*** -.01  .00  -.02*** -.02*** -.01*  -.02***
19.  Domain = HRM   0.04  0.20  .02*  -.10*** .00  .02**  -.02*** -.01**  -.00  .01 
20.  Domain = R&D  0.05  0.21  .05*** .02*** -.08***  -.02*** -.04*** -.03*** .00  -.01 
21. Domain=  engineering  0.04  0.19  .05*** .12*** -.05***  -.03*** -.04*** -.01**  -.00  -.01* 
22.  Domain = ICT  0.09  0.29  .06*** .18*** -.06***  -.04*** -.03*** -.03*** -.01  -.01* 
  0.16  0.37  -.15*** -.05*** .03***  .05*** .06*** .00  .03*** .03***
24.  Job level = top manager  0.02  0.14  .19*** .06*** .10***  -.01**  -.01  .07*** .01  0.00 
25.  Job level = senior manager  0.04  0.20  .28*** .10*** .15***  -.01**  -.03*** .04*** -.01  -.00 
26.  Job level = middle manager   0.19  0.39  .28*** .12*** .08***  -.03*** -.07*** .01**  -.02*** -.01* 
27.  Job level = professional   0.25  0.43  .09*** .08*** -.07***  -.04*** -.06*** -.01**  .00  -.01 
28.  Job level = operational  0.39  0.49  -.34*** -.05*** -.07***  .03*** .09*** -.02*** .01*  .01** 
29.  Budget > 0 €  0.13  0.33  .11*** .06*** .05***  -.02*** -.04*** .01*  -.01  -.00 
0.05  0.23  .17*** .08*** .06***  -.02*** -.04*** .03*** -.00  -.01 
0.05  0.23  .27*** .11*** .08***  -.03*** -.04*** .04*** -.00  -.00 
32.  ordinates > 0  0.29  0.45  .35*** .19*** .18***  -.04*** -.07*** .05*** -.01*  -.01 
33.  Number of subordinates > 5  0.13  0.34  .29*** .16*** .19***  -.03*** -.05*** .03*** -.001  .00 
34.  Number of subordinates > 15  0.05  0.22  .18*** .11*** .13***  -.02*** -.04*** .02*** -.00  -.00 
35.  Number of subordinates > 29  0.02  0.15  .14*** .08*** .10***  -.01**  -.02*** .01  -.01  .00 
36.  Sector = metallurgy  0.09  0.28  .06*** .13*** .04***  -.03*** -.03*** -.01**  -.02*** -.01* 
37.  Sector = chemicals  0.05  0.21  .11*** .06*** .04***  -.02*** -.03*** -.02*** -.02*** -.01 
cs   0.03  0.16  .07*** -.03*** -.03***  -.01  -.03*** -.01  -.01  -.01 
  0.03  0.16  .03*** .02*** .01  .00  -.01  .01  -.01**  .00 
40.  ction   0.03  0.17  -.01** .04*** .00  -.01  -.01  .03*** .00  -.01 
41.  Sector = wood industry  0.02  0.14  .01  .03*** .03***  -.02**  -.01  .00  .00  .00 
= 
5.  Unemployment  (years)
6. Self-employment  (yea
9.  Degree = highe
10.  Degree = higher 
16.  Domain = sales 
17.  Domain = after sa
23. Domain = operations 
30.  Budget > 2499 € 
31.  Budget > 24999 € 
Number of sub
38.  Sector = pharmaceuti
39.  Sector = food industry
Sector = constru
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Variable  Mean  s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
42.  Sector = textile industry  0.01  0.11  -.01** -.03*** .01  .00  .00  .01  -.01  -.01 
43.  Sector = energy and utilities  0.01  0.12  .02*** .03*** -.01  -.01**  -.01*  .00  .00  .00 
44.  Sector = ICT   0.08  0.27  .05*** .13*** -.06***  -.04*** -.04*** -.02*** .00  -.01 
45.  Sector = banking   0.06  0.24  .06*** -.01  .00  -.02**  -.03*** -.01*  -.01**  -.01* 
46.  Sector = business   0.06  0.24  .00  -.04*** -.08***  -.01  -.03*** -.01  .00  -.01* 
logistics  0.06  0.24  -.01  .04*** .04***  -.01*  .00  .01**  -.01  .00 
0.06  0.24  -.10*** -.03*** .00  .02*** .03*** .04*** -.01  .00 
49.  Sector = telecommunications  0.04  0.19  .04*** .04*** -.03***  -.01**  -.01  -.01**  .00  .00 
50.  Sector = advertising and media  0.03  0.18  -.03*** -.03*** -.06***  -.01*  .00  .02*** .00  .00 
51.  Sector = HR services  0.02  0.14  -.02*** -.08*** -.04***  .01  -.01**  -.01  -.01  .00 
52.  Sector = tourism and leisure activities  0.01  0.10  -.06*** -.05*** -.02***  .00  .01*  .00  .00  .02***
53.  Sector = company services  0.03  0.17  -.05*** -.01  .02***  .02*** .04*** .02*** .00  .01 
54.  Sector = health care  0.06  0.23  -.02*** -.12*** .01  .09*** -.01  .00  .03*** .01** 
0.05  0.22  -.03*** -.09*** .00  .03*** .01*  -.02*** .02*** .02** 
0.04  0.19  -.02*** .02*** .07***  -.01*  .01**  -.01  .01**  .01 
57.  Sector = welfare services  0.03  0.17  -.05*** -.08*** .00  .03*** .05*** .00  .01*  .01** 
58.  Sector = local government  0.03  0.17  -.04*** -.02*** .04***  .02*** .05*** -.01  .01  .00 
59.  Sector = regional government  0.02  0.13  .00  -.02*** .01***  .00  .02*** .00  .00  .00 
60.  Sector = cultural services  0.01  0.12  -.04*** -.04*** -.01*  .01**  .05*** .00  .03*** .01** 
61.  Sector = international government  0.01  0.09  .03*** -.01  .02***  .00  .02*** .00  .01**  .00 
  0.00  0.05  -.02*** .00  .00  .00  .00  .01*  .00  .00 
63.  s > 9   0.89  0.32  .14*** .06*** .03***  -.02*** -.07*** -.07*** -.02*** -.01 
64.  Number of employees > 49  0.69  0.46  .17*** .06*** .05***  -.02*** .07*** -.06*** -.02*** -.01* 
65.  Number of employees > 199  0.50  0.50  .16*** .06*** .05***  -.02*** -.05*** -.05*** -.02*** -.00 
66.  Number of employees > 199  0.36  0.48  .14*** .05*** .05***  -.01*  -.04*** -.05**  -.02**  .00 
67.  Number of employees > 999  0.27  0.44  .12*** .05*** .05***  -.01**  -.03*** -.04*** -.01**  .00 
68.  Contract = temporary  0.07  0.28  -.14*** -.09*** -.18***  -.01  .06*** -.01*  .03*** .01 
y worker  0.03  0.16  -.13*** -.05*** -.07***  .01  .06  .01  .03*** .01* 
  41.7  8.87  .30*** .27*** .03***  -.14  -.13*** .04*** -.02*** -.03***
71.  work  0.10  0.30  -.04*** -.28*** .08***  .20*** .13*** .01**  .03*** .03***
47.  Sector = transport and 
48.  Sector = retail and wholesale 
55.  Sector = education 
56.  Sector = federal government 
62. Sector = agriculture 
Number of employee
69.  Contract = agenc
70.  Weekly working hours
Employment = part-time 
n=44,384 
* p<.05 
**   p<.01 
***  p<.001
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 1 shows, duration of the two work spells (wage employment and self-employment) is posi-
ed with the logarithm of wage. However, earnings are negatively correlated with the
n of the four non-work spells (family leaves, unemployment, educational leaves and other 
ks). All five career break types correlate positively with each other, suggesting that breaks of
 do not exclude, but rather go hand in hand with interruptions of another type. The only 
n is the correlation between the duration of self-employment and family leaves, which does 
ificantly from zero. 
 reports gender-specific differences in monthly wage, years in employment and duration of 
r breaks. The gender wage gap amounts to approximately 650 euro in gross monthly 
ensation. The most striking result concerns the occurrence and average duration of family 
While four out of ten women interrupted their career for family reasons, only 3.3% of men
e. To a large part, this difference is due to the inclusion of childbirth leaves in our 
ption of family leaves. In addition, the average man has a shorter history of unemployment
a slightly longer history of self-employment than the average woman. Female and male
s interrupt their career roughly in equal measure for educational purposes and “other 
sons”.  
  Gender-specific descriptive statistics of key variables  
 Men  Women 
s.d.  %  break 
a Mean s.d.  %  break 
a
Monthly gross wage (€)  3 108.36  1 540.66    2 462.76  1 174.02   
Log monthly gross wage (log €)  7.95  0.40    7.74  0.35   
Wage employment (years)  11.82  9.29    9.73  8.17   
Family leaves (years)  0.02  0.18  3.3  0.41  1.27  39.0 
Unemployment  (years)  0.28 0.68  41.2  0.41 1.03  45.9 
Self-employment  (years)  0.36 1.85  8.3  0.25 1.44 6.6 
Educational leaves (years)  0.07 0.41  5.5  0.08 0.42 6.9 
Other  breaks  (years)  0.06 0.41  7.8  0.07 0.60 7.2 
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rts the regression results for men and women.  
  OLS results of gender-specific wage regressions 
a Women 
b
Dependent variable:  
log monthly gross wage  β sign.  % 
change
  SE  β sign. % 
change  SE 
Wage employment (years)  .032  ***  3.29
 c .0004 .024  ***  2.44
 c .0008 
Wage employment (years²)  -.001  ***  -0.05  .0006  .000  ***  -0.03  .0000 
Family leaves (years)  -.046  **  -4.46  .0024  -.010  ***  -1.04  .0024 
Family leaves (years²)  .000    0.00  .0142  .000    0.01  .0001 
Unemployment (years)  -.072  ***  -6.95  .0022  -.040  ***  -3.95  .0028 
Unemployment (years²)  .004  ***  0.36  .0032  .002  ***  0.21  .0002 
Self-employment (years)  .000    0.04  .0180  .001    0.15  .0024 
Self-employment (years²)  .000    0.01  .0016  .000    0.01  .0001 
Educational leaves (years)  .011  1.06  .0001  -.012    -1.16  .0101 
Educational leaves (years²) -.002    -0.21  .0093  .002    0.19  .0029 
Other breaks (years)  -.022  ***  -2.18  .0004  .015  **  1.46  .0054 
Other breaks (years²)  .001  **  0.12  .0054  -.001  ***  -0.14  .0004 
Degree = higher education of 1 cycle 
e .112 ***  11.88  .0000  .125  ***  13.32  .0049 
Degree = higher education of 2 cycles  .209  ***  23.29  .0045  .234  ***  26.38  .0115 
Degree = university   .302  ***  35.24  .0071  .293  ***  34.09  .0072 
Domain = general management 
e .114 ***  12.06  .0057  .077  *** 8.02  .0149 
Domain = administration  .046  ***  4.75  .0097  -.006    -0.57  .0114 
Domain = technical support  .044  ***  4.49  .0097  -.079  ***  -7.57  .0143 
Domain = marketing   .070  ***  7.27  .0089  .035  *  3.51  .0155 
Domain = sales  .093  ***  9.72  .0132  .000    -0.03  .0120 
Domain = after sales services  .042  ***  4.30  .0087  -.021    -2.08  .0332 
Domain = finance   .070  ***  7.25  .0123  .032  *  3.21  .0127 
Domain = HRM   .040  **  4.06  .0105  .028  *  2.81  .0136 
Domain = R&D  .087  ***  9.05  .0132  .023    2.28  .0170 
Domain= engineering  .106  ***  11.19  .0124  .075  **  7.80  .0282 
Domain = ICT  .112  ***  11.80  .0114  .082  ***  8.57  .0167 
Domain = operations  .057  ***  5.90  .0096  .004    0.39  .0121 
Job level = top manager 
e .400 ***  49.15  .0087  .187  ***  20.52  .0196 
Job level = senior manager  .376  ***  45.61  .0140  .201  ***  22.26  .0152 
Job level = middle manager   .224  ***  25.10  .0115  .136  ***  14.52  .0085 
Job level = professional   .146  ***  15.77  .0093  .087  ***  9.09  .0070 
Job level = operational  .036  ***  3.71  .0088  -.008    -0.82  .0058 
Budget > 0 € 
e .017 *** 1.73  .0085  .024  *** 2.48  .0069 
Budget > 2499 €  .052  ***  5.36  .0053  .081  ***  8.44  .0122 
Budget > 24999 €  .139  ***  14.92  .0073  .122  ***  12.93  .0142 
Number of subordinates > 0 
e .023 *** 2.36  .0074  .037  *** 3.80  .0070 
Number of subordinates > 5  .020  **  2.02  .0050  .007    0.66  .0108 
Number of subordinates > 15  -.027  **  -2.64  .0064  -.011    -1.08  .0185 
Number of subordinates > 29  .011    1.08  .0093  .043  *  4.36  .0257 
Sector = metallurgy 
e .126 ***  13.38  .0116  .084  *** 8.76  .0138 
Sector = chemicals  .250  ***  28.34  .0105  .175  ***  19.15  .0151 
Sector = pharmaceutics   .214  ***  23.86  .0117  .202  ***  22.33  .0163 
Sector = food industry  .115  ***  12.18  .0153  .055  **  5.66  .0171 
Sector = construction   .066  ***  6.85  .0133  .056  ***  5.79  .0166 
Sector = wood industry  .125  ***  13.30  .0131  .057  **  5.89  .0189 
Sector = textile industry  .092  ***  9.60  .0137  .044  *  4.47  .0179 
Sector = energy and utilities  .202  ***  22.43  .0183  .088  ***  9.21  .0242 
Sector = ICT   .148  ***  15.99  .0161  .091  ***  9.52  .0154 
Sector = banking   .163  ***  17.73  .0112  .125  ***  13.34  .0130 
Sector = business   .138  ***  14.78  .0118  .064  ***  6.65  .0132 
Sector = transport and logistics  .110  ***  11.64  .0129  .087  ***  9.14  .0132 
Sector = retail and wholesale  .031  **  3.15  .0109  -.027  *  -2.71  .0121 
Sector = telecommunications  .180  ***  19.71  .0112  .098  ***  10.32  .0154 
Sector = advertising and media  .101  ***  10.58  .0126  .072  ***  7.41  .0150 
Sector = HR services  .103  ***  10.90  .0140  .037  *  .0161  3.81 
Sector = tourism and leisure activities  .000    -0.05  .0205  -.045  *  .0187  -4.44 
Sector = company services  .043  **  4.42  .0222  .007    .0145  0.75 
Sector = health care  .116  ***  12.35  .0132    ***  .0122  .078 8.14 
Sector = education  .054  ***  5.50  .0134  ***  .0134  .049  5.05 
Sector = federal government  .031  *  3.20  .0140  -.017    .0150  -1.69 
Sector = we .016    1.64  .0124    .0135  lfare services  .017  1.75 
Sector = local government  .014    1.40  .0147  -.002    .0143  -0.19 
Sector = regional government  .054  **  5.55  .0137      .0172  .018 1.81 
Sector = cultural services  -.019    -1.90  .0165  .002    .0177  0.22  
W
 Men 
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a Women 
b
Dependent variable:  
log monthly gross wage  β sign.  % 
change
  SE  β sign. % 
change  SE 
Sector = international government  .234  ***  26.42  .0194  .150  ***  16.15  .0227 
Sector = agriculture  .092  **  9.59  .0210  -.054    -5.22  .0437 
Number of employees > 9 
e .060 *** 6.16  .0354  .062  *** 6.39  .0068 
Number of employees > 49  .040  ***  4.08  .0067  .038  ***  3.90  .0063 
Number of employees > 199  .030  ***  3.07  .0056  .019  **  1.95  .0072 
Number of employees > 199  .008  ***  0.77  .0060  .001    0.07  .0087 
Number of employees > 999  .034    3.49  .0073  .006    0.62  .0079 
Contract = temporary 
e -.032 ***  -3.19  .0065  -.051  ***  -4.93  .0074 
Contract = agency worker  -.094  ***  -8.97  .0082  -.078  ***  -7.50  .0107 
Weekly working hours  .004  ***  0.40  .0125  .004  ***  0.39  .0003 
Employment = part-time 
e .179 ***  19.59  .0002  .137  ***  14.72  .0058 
Intercept 6.937  ***  1030 
d .0180 7.074  ***  1180 
d .0199 
Adjusted R²  .57 ***  .44*** 
a   n=25,541 
b    n= 18,838 
c   (e
β-1)*100, to be interpreted as the percentage wage change due to a unit increase in the predictor variable 
d   e
intercept, to be interpreted as the starting wage for the reference employee 
e   Reference categories: degree = lower education; domain = logistics; job level = administrative; budget = smaller than 
specified; number of subordinates = smaller than specified; sector = hotel and catering; number of employees = smaller 
than specified; contract = permanent; employment = full-time 
*   p<.05 
**   p<.01 
***  p<.001 
Consistent with other research (e.g. Albrecht et al., 1999; Spivey, 2005), we find a positive effect of 
years in wage employment. The quadratic terms, which are significantly negative in both models, 
imply a gradual but slow decrease in the return on wage employment experience. Additionally, we 
see that the return on an extra year of wage employment is smaller for women than for men.  
Family leaves have a negative impact on wages. The wage penalty is especially severe for male 
employees: a one-year family-related leave is equivalent to a 4.5% penalty in monthly wage (with 
the percentage change in wage level calculated as (e
β-1)*100). For women, the financial penalty is 
only 1%. 
Similar effects are found with respect to the duration of unemployment spells. Unemployment 
spells lead to lower wages for both men and women. However, the penalty for one extra year spent 
in unemployment gets less severe the longer the spell lasts. Again, the penalty is stronger for men. 
The duration of self-employment spells does not have a significant effect on the current wage. In 
addition, the effect of one year of self-employment on earnings is significantly lower than the effect 
of one year in wage employment (at least for the first 33 years in the male regression model and for 
the first 18 years in the female regression), as there is no overlap in the 95% confidence intervals. 
A self-employment trial is rewarded less than spending the same amount of time in wage employ-
ment. Yet, self-employment does not involve a direct wage penalty either. These results apply to 
men and women alike. 
The wage impact of the duration of educational  es is positive for men and negative for women. 
However, both co icients are in cant.  
Career breaks fo r reason decreasin effect on men’s wag  
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 visualizes the evolution of the log wage penalty/premium of wage employment and the five
r break types as a function of their duration.  
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n 
examined the wage implications of different types of career breaks among a sample of more
44,000 Belgian employees. We complemented existing research in several ways. In line with
studies in this area (e.g. Spivey, 2005), we used a mixed-gender sample and performed the
s separately for men and women. We included several types of interruptions in our model. 
al family-related breaks and unemployment spells, we also took self-
nt spells and educational leaves into account. Furthermore, we included the quadratic
break duration variables. This allows us to map out the relationship between the dura-
ption and the later wage into more detail compared to studies investigating a
ear relationship (e.g. Albrecht et al., 1999; Gullason, 1991).  
nalyses revealed some interesting findings. First, different types of career breaks were shown
on wages. We found a wage penalty for unemployment spells and family 
ks, while the wage impact of self-employment and educational leaves was insignificant. This is
n capital and signaling arguments outlined in the literature section. The
se in human capital caused by unemployment and family leaves may lower the wage. More-
reaks may signal a lack of ability (unemployment) or commitment (family leave) to
rs. The zero-effect of self-employment and educational leaves can also be explained by 
 capital and signaling effects. Although self-employment spells and educational leaves may 
se a loss of job- and organization-specific knowledge and skills, this loss may be compensated
 increase in human capital acquired during self-employment or through education. Further-
pending on the specific skill requirements, these career breaks may be considered by
rs as either an asset or as a sign of low commitment. 
s of break have an effect on wages while others did not, the effect of break 
n turned out to vary as well. In the case of unemployment spells, the wage depreciation
wed down gradually. The impact of family breaks, on the other hand, did not decrease with
n. This implies that, after a certain time out, the wage penalty for family leaves may exceed
e for unemployment. In our sample, this was found to happen after 7 years in the case of
nd after 14 years for female workers. A possible explanation is that, after a considerable time
n capital depreciation effect diminishes in relative importance (e.g. because skills and
wledge have attained some minimum level) and the impact of signaling starts to dominate.
y-breaks and long-term unemployment spells may generate different signals. Family-
breaks may be considered as a conscious choice “against” one’s career and may therefore 
nalized more severely than unemployment spells, which may be perceived to imply some
we found some interesting gender differences. Family breaks and unemployment spells
e more harmful for male than for female employees. This is consistent with our expecta-
 breaks are generally less common among men (in our sample too, see
al associated with them – and hence the wage impact – is likely to be more nega-
 than for women. The gender difference is most pronounced for the family-related 
ks, which can indeed be considered the most ‘feminine’ among the interruption types. How-
ght of the persisting gender wage gap (Baum, 2002; Blau & Ferber, 1990; Gullason, 
), it is plausible that men th a history of ly leaves are still earning more than   
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d not find any gender differences for the effects of self-employment and educational leaves. 
wage penalty for these breaks is non-significant for both sexes. By contrast, the impact of the 
dual ‘other’ career breaks differed substantially. For men, the impact was negative at a 
sing rate. For women, other breaks had a positive impact on the subsequent wage, with the
g down as the spell continues. An explanation could be that the activities
rtaken by men and women during these breaks differ. Perhaps, men fill their ‘other’ breaks 
n-work activities, such as travel or rest, while women use their ‘other’ breaks to work without
rmally employed, for instance, in their husband’s business. If this assumption is true, the
all) wage premium could be related to the human capital women accumulate during such inter-
s.  
we found that the effects of career breaks vary with the break type, the break duration and
er. Except for ‘other breaks’ taken by women, none of the career break types had a posi-
the subsequent wage, although educational leaves and self-employment spells were 
zed either.  
dings can be useful to employees considering a career break. Insight in the effects on sub-
uent earnings may influence career-related decisions. The non-positive wage effect of educa-
leaves and self-employment spells may be of interest to policy makers. Many governments 
 nowadays looking for ways to enhance lifelong learning (Griffin, 2006; Jones, 2005) and entre-
eurship (Williams, 2000; Williams & Kitaev, 2005). The lack of financial reward (no higher sub-
uent wages) may discourage individuals to engage in adult education or in an entrepreneurial
ct. This barrier may be heightened by other financial implications, such as the wage loss and
 growth during the break, the costs incurred by courses (in case of an educational
and the financial capital needed to start a business (in case of a self-employment trial).
ments may want to look into these potential barriers and search for ways to deal with them. 
Limitations and future research 
tions of our study merit discussion. First, notwithstanding the large size of our data-
procedure we used to collect the data implies the risk of a non-representative sample. By
weight to each data point, we tried to improve on the generalizability of the results. 
d, the financial impact of career breaks extends well beyond effects on remuneration in sub-
uent employment. There is the income loss incurred during the interruption, as well as the 
ability of a post-break unemployment spell, or the break stretching into permanent inactivity. 
our dataset was restricted to employees who were working in April 2006, we opted to limit 
ssment of the financial repercussions of career breaks to their impact on non-zero wages, 
ditional on the interruption being followed by a period of wage employment. However, in
r to calculate the full financial implication of a career break, future research might look into the 
e loss during the break and address our problem of sample selection bias by sampling from
ral population (i.e. not only active employees). 
post-break career advancement and wage progression may be related to pre-break behavior 
atment. Employees anticipating a career break could be inclined to work in industries (e.g. 
c sector) where the wage penalty is t ght to be less severe (Nielsen et al., 20 ). 
Anticipating on the ge penalty itself, they may  for jobs with high initial  y but little wage 
growth (Gupta & Smith, 2002). P pects of futu interruption wer incentives for on-
the-job training, both for the employee and the em will be shorter 
(Corcoran et al., 1983). In short, individuals who anti or plan a career bre ay select or be 
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e penalty might be attributable to self-selection effects. However, we tried to alleviate this 
em as much as possible by including a great deal of control variables in the model. 
we only took the career break type and duration into account. However, there are many
spects to career breaks that may influence their wage impact. For instance, career interrup-
n be voluntary or involuntary. They can be anticipated, planned for or occur unexpectedly.
reak can be full-time or consist of a partial reduction of working hours. The pre-break 
nt contract can be terminated or merely suspended, allowing the breakers to return to
ed-upon period of time. Other parameters are the career stage in which the
ook place and the amount of time since the break ended. Our data did not provide
s on voluntariness, planning, the number of breaks, nor their timing. Future research might 
examine the impact of (several of) these aspects, together with the effect of break type and
n. 
ntioned above, we only looked into one specific effect of career breaks, namely their 
n wages in subsequent employment. Apart from the wage impact, there are many other 
sequences one could consider, both financial and non-financial. In most cases, a career inter-
also produces a direct financial loss during the break, in the form of foregone wages. Fur-
career breaker might miss out on employer-organized training and career progression that 
en obtained by staying. Moreover, career breaks, at least those of predetermined
n, can be followed by either another inactivity spell or some professional activity. A new term
nal inactivity can be of the same type (e.g. a young mother prolonging her maternity 
e made under an alternative arrangement (e.g. a young father opting to be a home-
r after his parental leave expires). In some cases, a career break is a prelude to a permanent
arket retreat, as in the example of a late-career sabbatical flowing into early retirement.
career break may have psychological effects. Persons on a break may rearrange their
rities, lose their career commitment or adjust to a slower pace making it hard to rejoin the labor 
r workers may come out of a career break rejuvenated, ready to pursue old, new or
d career goals with a vengeance. In the latter case, the career break might have a positive
individual’s subjective career success (i.e. career satisfaction), which may be consid-
more important than a decrease in objective career success (i.e. wage). It seems particularly 
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